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The project examines the performance of the external management procedure on the data set from the arbitration court 
of the Udmurt Republic and the unique data set of politically connected firms that went bankrupt 1995–2004 in Russia. 
We use a narrow definition of political connections: a CEO or a member of an executive board being a member of par-
liament or a top executive at the federal, regional, or municipal level. We show that political connections matter for the 
timing of bankruptcy procedures. Also, political connections do not result in efficiency-enhancing bankruptcies; in line 
with a politicians-and-firms story, politically connected firms preserve employment rather than increase productivity. 
Based on the court level data, we find that debt concentration increases likelihood of external management initiation, 
whereas external management itself decreases the share of total debt repaid. However, there is no evidence of adminis-
trative expenses inflation in favor of a particular unsecured creditor under the assumption of a tradeoff between inflation 
of administrative expenses and main debt repayment. 
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
Emerging market countries' economic growth largely depends on investments; therefore, impor-
tance of protection of investor rights makes functioning bankruptcy regime a top priority for pol-
icy makers. Generally, if investor rights are protected then debtors benefit from lower cost of 
capital. At the same time, effective bankruptcy law should provide framework for discrimination 
between firms that should be liquidated and ones that should be preserved as going concerns. 
Consequently, two bankruptcy procedures exist in Russia: liquidation (US Chapter-7-like) that 
ceases firms' operations and external management (US Chapter-11-like) that provides opportunity 
for restructuring. 
Numerous anecdotal evidence and prior research on Russian bankruptcy law reveal capture of bank-
ruptcy procedures. Prior study by Lambert-Mogiliansky, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya (2003) argues that 
hostility of regional governors toward federal center increases likelihood of external management, 
whereas external management itself does not bring any efficiency improvement and leaves outside 
creditors' claims unsatisfied. In the recent version of their paper from 2006 they also present evi-
dence on the effect of judicial quality. However, debate whether a bankruptcy procedure should be 
liquidation — or continuation-biased is not resolved yet in academic literature. The results of our 
study on the sample of Russian firms go in line with the argument of Berglof, Bolton, Guriev, and 
Zhuravskaya (2006) for liquidation-biased procedure in emerging market economies. 
We examine three aspects of Russian bankruptcy: (1) initiation; (2) performance; and (3) debt re-
payment. The effect of the presence of direct political connections is studied in the data set for large 
and medium Russian industrial firms whereas external management issues are studied in the data set 
from the arbitration court of the Udmurt Republic. 
Importantly, Russian judiciary has discretionary power over initiation of external management or 
liquidation. At the same time, politicians who simultaneously manage firms might exercise influ-
ence over judges in order to impose preferable procedure on their firms in case of bankruptcy; ex-
ternal management seems to be this procedure since it provides time and resources to turn the out-
come in politicians' favor, i.e. to bail out, to prevent employment cuts, etc. Using Cox proportional 
hazards regression with IV technique, we find that the presence of direct political connections de-
fers liquidation and does not affect timing of external management. Moreover, politically connected 
firms do not have significantly different performance under external management compared with 
those that are not politically connected. 
Further, the data on bankruptcy cases from the arbitration court of the Udmurt Republic is analyzed 
using logit regressions. The results reveal positive effect of debt concentration on initiation of ex-
ternal management, whereas external management decreases probability of high debt repayment. 
That might manifest abuse of external management when assets are tunnelled by parties since high 
debt concentration implies the absence of checks from rival creditors. Surprisingly, we do not find 
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
 
 
5
evidence of rise in administrative expenses in favor of a particular unsecured creditor; but the re-
sults of this test heavily depend on our assumptions. 
Overall, evidence presented in this paper coincide with the view of some practitioners and re-
searches that Russian bankruptcy should be liquidation-biased. However, even keeping less sophis-
ticated procedure one should be concerned with independence of judges that is currently quite an 
issue in Russia. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The lack of effective bankruptcy law has long been recognized as one of the major institutional 
weaknesses of Russia's business environment (Tompson, 2004). Non-transparent procedures, ab-
sence of an effective mechanism for monitoring bankruptcy administrators, and high degree of poli-
ticization weaken the protection of both debtors and creditors. As a consequence, it adversely af-
fects economic growth by making outside financing more expensive. 
This research is the first one to question the effect of the presence of direct political connection on 
the bankruptcy initiation and firms' performance under external management. In addition, we look 
at the court-level data on bankruptcy cases to find what drives external management initiation and 
how this procedure affects debt repayment. 
Current law, adopted in 2002, is the third post-Soviet bankruptcy law. The first one, adopted in 
1992, was woefully inadequate and barely functioning at all leading to just a few procedures 
(Tompson, 2004). Thereafter, the law of 1998 almost doubled the number of cases. The procedure 
was easily manipulated: bogus debts were often employed; creditors did not accept repayments to 
keep debtors in bankruptcy; complicated business chains were created to strip assets, etc. The gov-
ernment estimated that at least a third of all bankruptcy cases are either hostile takeovers or attacks 
by firms who have bought up rivals' debts specifically for the purpose of bankrupting them. New 
industry of bankruptcies "to order" emerged. 
In Russia, courts have discretion over creditors' decision about initiation of external management or 
liquidation. External management is a continuation-biased procedure when a firm is given the 
chance to restore to solvency, whereas a firm ceases operation under liquidation. In case solvency is 
not restored within a certain time-frame under external management, the firm goes into liquidation. 
Yet, there is no agreement whether bankruptcy should be liquidation or continuation-biased in the 
academic literature. However, empirical evidence from this study argue for the liquidation-biased 
procedure. 
This research is based on several stylized facts about bankruptcy in Russia: (1) judges' discretion over 
initiation of external management or liquidation; (2) high political involvement in case of large insol-
vent firms; (3) low rate of restorings to solvency under external management, around 3%; (4) often 
corrupt bankruptcy administrators; (5) low ultimate debt repayments to unsecured creditors. Undoubt-
edly, this is not a complete list. Below, we present the discussion of these stylized facts. 
As a rule, bankruptcy outcome is mainly shaped by court-appointed bankruptcy administrators who 
manage each stage. Corruption and manipulation of bankruptcy proceeds flourish despite adminis-
trators' legal responsibility to ensure that rights of both creditors and debtors are respected. As the 
journal Expert (2001) argues, appointment of a friendly bankruptcy administrator is decisive. 
Moreover, bankruptcy administrators often violate the absolute priority rule in the interests of par-
ticular creditors. The ordering of debt repayment (the absolute priority rule), as stated by the 1998 
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bankruptcy law, tended to mean that unsecured creditors had little hope to recover anything because 
their claims were to be satisfied only after tax claims. At the same time tax claims represent a sub-
stantial share of total debt, around 70%. We suggest that abuse of the absolute priority rule could be 
done using external management (that holds also for the 2002 law): a creditor becomes an adminis-
trative expenses claimant (these expenses are repaid first) and secures at least some share of liquida-
tion value. 
Unfortunately, current attempts to prevent abuses by bankruptcy administrators are not successful. 
The evolution of monitoring bodies is presented in Appendix A1. 
Overall, external management does not accomplish its legislative goal and most firms are liquidated 
after the procedure. Low rate of successful solvency restorings brings up a natural question: What 
was then the motivation behind initiation of external management? To answer this question we ex-
amine two hypothetical scenarios: politicians-and-firms and administrative-expenses. The politi-
cians-and-firms scenario argues that external management is exploited by politically connected 
firms in order to preserve employment and provide bailout. Whereas the administrative-expenses 
scenario suggests that external management is initiated to inflate administrative expenses in favor of 
a particular unsecured creditor. 
First, to test the politicians-and-firms scenario we use the panel of firms' direct political connec-
tions 1995–2004. We find that this scenario holds partially: the presence of direct political con-
nections postpones liquidation but is irrelevant for external management; moreover, performance 
of politically connected firms is not different from performance of not politically connected ones 
in terms of sales and labor productivity. At the same time, there is no reduction in employment 
following external management, whereas excess employment is claimed to be responsible for low 
efficiency of Russian firms. As a result, external management temporary prevents employment 
cuts at the expense of low labor productivity irrespective to the presence of direct political con-
nections. 
Second, to test the administrative-expenses scenario we use the data set from the arbitration court of 
the Udmurt Republic. This scenario also holds partially: higher concentration of debt leads to 
greater likelihood of external management being initiated and external management decreases like-
lihood of high total debt repayment. However, inflation of administrative expenses in favor of a par-
ticular unsecured creditor is rejected. We test the administrative-expenses scenario under the as-
sumption of a tradeoff between rise in administrative expenses and repayment of the main debt 
which emerged before bankruptcy. In other words, if the creditor inflates administrative expenses 
then, in the case the firm is liquidated, his main debt (which is paid out after repayments to employ-
ees, secured creditors and pro rata with tax arrears) will decrease. 
This scenario implies that if the creditor's desired procedure is initiated by the court's discretion, i.e. 
under greater threat of manipulation by the creditor, then the main debt repayment to the creditor is 
expected to decrease under the assumption of the tradeoff. So far, there is no evidence that support 
this hypothesis. Important to note that rejection of the administrative-expenses scenario by this par-
ticular test does not imply that there is no inflation of expenses since the creditor might not face the 
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
 
 
8
assumed tradeoff; so that he gets advantage of both administrative expenses and his main debt re-
payment by manipulating the procedure at the expense of other creditors. 
The ultimate objective of this research is to investigate the performance of the external management 
procedure in order to take a stand in the dispute over whether bankruptcy procedure should be con-
tinuation-biased or liquidation-biased. The obtained results argue in favor of liquidation-biased pro-
cedure for Russia. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the literature review. Section 3 presents the key 
story that has motivated this research. Section 4, 5, and 6 list hypotheses and highlight empirical 
testing regarding: (1) initiation of bankruptcy; (2) performance under external management; and (3) 
effect of external management on debt repayment. Section 7 concludes. 
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
There is a large strand of literature studying the phenomenon of bankruptcy. Ideally, the bankruptcy 
law should (1) protect creditors, (2) impose financial discipline on managers, (3) induce restructur-
ing, and (4) free assets from inefficient use (Hart, 2001). 
Hart (2000) differentiates between two main types of bankruptcy procedures around the world: an 
assets sale (or a cash auction), and a structured bargaining. Asset sale is the simplest procedure 
when a firm is liquidated under the supervision of a trustee or a receiver. This procedure in the envi-
ronment of perfect capital markets generates an ex post efficient outcome. Nevertheless, Hart 
(2000) emphasizes that all recent changes have been in the direction of structured-bargaining-like 
procedures. 
A number of countries have developed bankruptcy procedures based of the idea of structured bar-
gaining over the future of an insolvent firm — in particular, whether it should be liquidated or 
reorganized and how its value should be divided up. The first creditors meeting decision about 
initiation of external management or liquidation under Russian law is a result of such bargaining. 
The leading example of structured bargaining outside of Russia is the Chapter 11 of the US Bank-
ruptcy Code. 
However, the Chapter 11 and Russian external management are not the same. As under the Chap-
ter 11, under external management a stay is put on creditors' claims (that is, they are frozen; no 
creditor is allowed to seize any of the firm's assets during the process). Claim-holders behave inde-
pendently, whereas under the Chapter 11 they are grouped into classes according to the type of the 
claim they have and committees or trustees are appointed to represent each class. In contrast to Rus-
sian external management, incumbent management usually runs the company under the Chapter 11, 
whereas it is deprived of all control rights in Russia. 
Still, there is a great debate about optimal bankruptcy law that satisfies three main objectives out-
lined above by Hart. Several modifications for increasing efficiency of bankruptcy were offered by 
Aghion et al. (1992), Hart et al. (1997), Hart (2000), and Bebchuk (2000). Independent perspective 
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for different optimality features of the law were also considered by Berkovitch et al. (1997), 
Berkovitch and Israel (1998), Gennaioli and Rossi (2006) and many others. 
Theoretical and empirical research concludes that there is no one-size-fits-all procedure and Davy-
denko and Franks (2005) suggest that bankruptcy codes do matter. The authors find that despite the 
bank lending adjustment to a particular bankruptcy law recovery rates are substantially different 
across the three countries with 92% in the UK, 67% in Germany, and 56% in France. Their observa-
tion goes in line with ranking of creditors protection in these countries: France has the lowest, the 
UK — the highest, and Germany lies in the middle. 
The strike of a right balance between continuation and liquidation is a special topic in the design of 
bankruptcy. Georgakopoulos (2001) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992) provide arguments in favor of 
continuation-biased law: recessions, credit crunches or selling cascades, industry-wide financial cri-
ses. Often, the absence of the continuation chapter rises concerns about over-liquidation. However, 
Stromberg (2000) demonstrates that agents themselves make efficient choice for continuation even 
when, as a rule, only liquidation procedure is utilized. He considers the cash auction bankruptcy in 
Sweden and finds strong evidence that a common bankruptcy outcome is a sale of the assets back to 
the incumbent management. That is the cash auction is very similarly implemented to the Chapter 11 
reorganization procedure. 
At the same time, continuation-biased procedure, like the Chapter 11 and external management, is 
subject to a great deal of criticism that involves: (1) high costs; (2) violation of absolute priority 
rule; (3) judicial discretion; (4) politicization of bankruptcy. Below we provide a review of each 
particular issue. 
Several papers, such as Cutler and Summers (1988), Glison (1998), LoPucki and Whitford (1993), 
and Tompson (2004), discuss high costs of bankruptcy procedures in terms of time, legal and ad-
ministrative expenses, and the threat of abuse by judges. The Chapter-11-like procedures increase 
these costs since they are more prone to manipulation, significantly more time-consuming, and in-
volve greater uncertainty. These costs, according to Weiss (1990) can be direct and indirect ones. 
Direct costs encompass legal and administrative fees, including costs of lawyers, accountants and 
other professionals involved in the bankruptcy filing. Indirect costs include a wide range of unob-
servable opportunity costs: lost sales and a decline in the value of inventory; increased operating 
costs; a reduction in the firm's competitiveness. 
Continuation-biased procedures sometimes violate the absolute priority rule (ordering of debt re-
payments stated by the law). For instance, we may observe a manipulation within administrative 
expenses in external management so as to allow unsecured creditors to change their status from 
'junior' to 'senior' claimants, whereas under the Chapter 11 creditors may voluntarily allow violation 
of the priority to obtain their proceeds in a timely manner (Weiss, 1990). 
The paper by Lambert-Mogiliansky, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya (2003) argues that Russian regional 
arbitration courts are captured by regional authorities. As a result, regional governors and incum-
bent managers of large firms exploit courts' discretion over initiation of external management or 
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liquidation to impose external management in order to leave outside claim holders unsatisfied. At 
the same time, according to the Doing Business report (2005) there is indeed a positive relation be-
tween the level of discretionary court power in bankruptcy and corruption. Moreover, Lambert-
Mogiliansky et al. (2003) suggest to deprive courts of their discretionary power in order to improve 
investor protection in Russia. 
The issue of Russian ill-functioning judiciary is widely voiced by mass-media. Often, foreign inves-
tors prefer to resolve business disputes with Russian firms abroad. However, Hendley (2004) sug-
gests that "unqualified pessimism about the enforceability of arbitrazh court judgements that has 
become standard in the scholarly literature and the popular press is unfounded".1 Claessens and 
Klapper (2002) find that greater judicial efficiency is associated with more frequent use of bank-
ruptcy, but combination of stronger creditor rights and greater judicial efficiency with less use; stay 
on assets (the case of external management) leads to fewer bankruptcies independently of the effi-
ciency of judicial system due to possible assets tunnelling under the stay. 
Needless to note that political dimension is also important for bankruptcy discussion since bankruptcy 
is often associated with a reduction in employment. Interesting theoretical and empirical research can 
be found in the analysis of political pressures from governors in order to protect local employment 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Desai and Goldberg, 2000; Slinko, Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya, 2003). 
Most public firms are encouraged by politicians seeking votes to employ too many people — a politi-
cians-and-firms story by Shleifer and Vishny (1994). Faccio (2005) discusses the effect of political 
connections on the value of the firm and its probability to be bailed out. She finds strong evidence that 
politically connected firms have significantly greater probability of being bailed out. 
The empirical evidence obtained in this research are in favor of liquidation-biased procedure that 
agrees with the opinion expressed in Berglof et al. (2006). Moreover, the Doing Business report 
(2005) strongly suggests that the most efficient bankruptcy laws in the subsample of developing and 
transition countries prescribe simple, fast, and cheap liquidation procedure. The report also claims 
that delays in bankruptcy account for one half of the difference between the average recovery rates 
in rich and poor countries. Interesting to note that external management seems to have the full set of 
inefficiencies listed by the Doing Business report (2005) since it is a rather time-consuming and ex-
pensive procedure. 
3. THE KEY STORY 
The state-owned, meat-packing plant GUP "Vostochny" (of the Udmurt Republic) went bankrupt in 
2000: a point in time in which the firm had accumulated wage arrears of 4.8 mln RUR (0.16 mln 
USD), budget and off-budget fund arrears of 28.8 mln RUR (0.89 mln USD), and trade arrears of 
                                                 
1 Important to note that sample used is small and biased since only those who apply to arbitration courts were inter-
viewed. 
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31.0 mln RUR (1 mln USD). The meat-processing plant had 60% share of the Republic's meat mar-
ket and constituted a company-town. The firm was owned by the Republic's Ministry of Agricul-
ture. FSFO2 filed for bankruptcy and opted for initiation of external management. 
One of the main external management objectives was to prevent employment cuts. The firm was 
reorganized into the joint-stock company OAO "Vostochny", and the regional government provided 
25 mln RUR (0.83 mln USD) in budget-guaranteed credits in order to support the reorganization. 
Anecdotal evidence claims that shares mainly were distributed privately among government affili-
ates; creditors were not paid back in full. Interestingly, the external manager was simultaneously a 
deputy of the Republic's Duma and he took on the post as a director general after the bankruptcy 
procedure was completed. 
Furthermore, this bankruptcy case is reported by the FSFO as a success story: the bankruptcy pro-
cedure has brought growth in employment, sales and labor productivity. In 2005, the firm employed 
2336 people and its sales reached 1133 mln RUR (37.77 mln USD). We lack data on the firm's dy-
namics of labor productivity under the external management term. However, following bankruptcy, 
there was a 2.3-fold increase in labor productivity from 2000 to 2005.3 Moreover, OAO 
"Vostochny" is listed as a top-five pig-farming meat-processing plant in Russia.4 More external 
management success stories from the Udmurt Republic is in Appendix A2. 
Our hypothetical scenario is the following. Politically connected (PC) firms are protected from en-
tering the state of bankruptcy. Moreover, PCs matter for the timing of external management (EM) 
and liquidation (LQ). In addition, PC firms are bailed out under EM, no restructuring follows, and 
EM is imposed to preserve employment. Overall, EM leads to a decrease in the total debt repay-
ment. The three aspects of EM are discussed in three separate sections: (1) initiation; (2) perform-
ance; and (3) total debt repayment. 
It is important to note that we define direct PCs in the following manner: a firm has direct PC if the 
CEO or a member of the executive board is a member of parliament or a top executive at the fed-
eral, regional, or municipal level. Therefore, it should be noted that the effects of PCs generally are 
underestimated in this study since we do not take into account neither local nor indirect PCs. 
4. INITIATION OF BANKRUPTCY 
4.1. Hypotheses 
This section discusses hypotheses related to the initiation of bankruptcy, in particular, effects of PCs. 
:1H  PCs have negative effect (delay) on bankruptcy timing. 
Theoretical motivation for this hypothesis can be found in a politicians-and-firms story by Sleifer 
and Vishny (1994): politicians may want to protect firms for the sake of preserving employment 
                                                 
2 Federal Bankruptcy Service for Financial Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy. 
3 Labor productivity was 18.3 thousand RUR in 2000 and 42.2 thousand RUR in 2005 (in prices of 1995). 
4 Official web-site of OAO "Vostochny" is www.vostoc.ru. 
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(securing votes). The survey of Russian firms in 1996 claimed that 45% of Russian managers re-
ported that firms they manage would be able to produce the same output with less labor.5 Therefore, 
in the case of independent courts, there might be need for employment cuts under EM to restore 
solvency and to exit the bankruptcy state. So, the presence of PCs is expected to have negative ef-
fect on the timing of bankruptcy. 
However, in the case of captured courts (Lambert-Mogiliansky et al. 2003), bankruptcy might pro-
vide means to leave outside creditors unsatisfied and to go out of the procedure without any reduc-
tion in employment. That might happen through EM when a firm is legally reorganized into a joint-
stock company and creditors are paid out of the proceeds from its stock sale. Then employment is 
preserved in the new joint-stock company and incumbent management benefits from cancelling out-
standing debts. So, under the alternative, we may get positive effect: PC firms take advantage of 
EM to leave outside claims unsatisfied and launch bankruptcy procedure as soon as it becomes 
easy-to-initiate, e.g. law 1998, 2002. For this reason, one might need to differentiate between the 
timing of EM and LQ. 
:2H  PCs have different effects on the timing of EM and LQ initiation: nonnegative for EM and 
negative for LQ. 
Judicial discretion with hypothetical political influence over judges can lead to special treatment of 
PC firms in bankruptcy context. For instance, courts' judgements in favor of PC EM can be moti-
vated by social-importance of debtors.6 There is anecdotal evidence that political connections, in-
deed, influence court decisions. 
As an illustration consider the bankruptcy case of GUP "Kirishsky biohimichesky zavod" (KBHZ) 
where Mr. Davydov was appointed as an external manager in 1997. Mr. Davydov entered politics in 
1990 as a member of the City Council of the town where KBHZ is located; since 1999 he served as a 
deputy in the regional parliament. In 1997, FSFO filed for bankruptcy of KBHZ (with federal tax ar-
rears constituting 90% of the total debt) and the court initiated external management appointing Mr. 
Davydov as an external manager. In nine months from the bankruptcy filing KBHZ changed its legal 
address in order to be entitled for company-town status. Important to note that under the bankruptcy 
law back then, company-town firms could extend external management term up to 10 years when 
municipality agrees to guarantee its debt repayments. Unsurprisingly in 2000, the court extended ex-
ternal management term up to 6 years when municipality (where Mr. Davydov had served as a mem-
ber of the City Council) agreed to be a guarantor of the creditors' claims. As a result, Mr. Davydov 
secured himself a CEO position and frozen tax arrears for 6 years. In 2000, FSFO appealed to the 
higher level court that decreed the lower level court to review its decision; however, the lower level 
court did not change its decision about extension of external management term (OOO "Regionalnoe 
                                                 
5 See A. Moskovskaya, Izbytochnaya zanyatost' na promyshlennyh predpriyatiyah Rossii: pro at contra, Voprosy 
Economiki 1, 50–72 (1998). 
6 Company-town (socially-important firm) is a firm that employs not less then 25% or 5000 residents of a built-up area 
(§ 169 law 2002). 
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agentstvo upravlenia dolgami", 2001). Moreover, from 2000 and on KBHZ was subsidized by the re-
gion and subsidies were not thoroughly motivated and controlled (Chamber of Control & Accounting 
of Leningrad oblast, 2003). One of possible explanations for the surprising luck of Mr. Davydov 
could be his extensive experience in politics both on the city and regional levels. 
PCs can benefit firms by postponing or pushing forward a procedure in case of captured courts. In 
other words, if the hypothesis holds and we consider two insolvent firms but one of them has PCs 
whereas the other does not then PC firm will enjoy longer time period from enactment of the law 
1998 (that states easy-to-initiate bankruptcy) till formal LQ rather than EM. Because EM does not 
induce firms' closure firms can still operate controlled by friendly external managers (Lambert-
Mogiliansky et al., 2003) leaving outside claims unsatisfied. Therefore, one can expect significantly 
positive or insignificant effect of PCs on the timing of EM. On the other hand, LQ implies PC firms' 
closure that most likely makes current management worse off. Thus, one can expect negative effect 
of PCs on the timing of LQ. As an extreme, PC firms might never be liquidated. Important to note 
that in the context of the second hypothesis the first hypothesis implies that the negative effect of 
PCs on the LQ initiation is stronger than nonnegative effect of PCs on EM initiation. 
Another possibility would be that independent courts make both EM and LQ inferior outcomes for 
incumbent PC management: PC management does not only lose control over its firm, but is also 
likely to lose votes of its employees. In addition, bankruptcy of PC firm might be a bad signal to 
other voters. So, PC firms may tend to employ the out-of-court settlement under the threat of bank-
ruptcy more often than non PC ones irrespective to whether EM or LQ is the most probable out-
come of bankruptcy initiation. 
4.2. Data 
The data set covers bankruptcy cases in Russia and is employed in the first two sections. The last 
section about the total debt repayment uses different data set from the arbitration court of the Ud-
murt Republic. 
Several data sets are used here: firm-level financial data come from the Russian Enterprize Registry 
Longitudinal Dataset (RERLD) of balance sheets for medium and large Russian industrial enter-
prizes; balance sheets information was also supplemented by the Prime-tass (2000–2004) data set. 
The Labyrinth was used to find the evidence of direct PCs. 
The main data set employed in this research is data assembled for the paper by Lambert-
Modiliansky, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya (2003).7 This data set is unbalanced panel of bankrupt and 
non bankrupt firms 1995–2000; bankruptcy records are up to 1999. The authors use bankruptcy 
cases only for 1998 and 1999 period. 
For firms from the main data set we have collected information on bankruptcy procedures from 
1999 till February 2006. Data on the year of LQ come from the journal Vestnik of FSFO from No-
                                                 
7 I am grateful to Ekaterina Zhuravskaya for this data set. 
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vember 1999 till January of 2003; LQ and EM announcements from January 2003 till February 
2006 are from Rossyiskaya gazeta; years of EM come also from AK&M8 news data base from 1999 
till February 2006. 
Then, new data on bankruptcy is merged with the main data set and financial data is updated using 
the Russian Enterprize Registry Longitudinal Dataset (RERLD) that produce unbalanced panel 
1995–2004. Because balance sheet data for one firm can be in different units in different years, i.e. 
hundreds, thousands, and millions, we adjust employment and industry deflated sales within a firm; 
importantly, adjusted values are not comparable between different firms.9 
The Labyrinth data set contains lists of elected candidates on city, regional and federal levels and 
short biographies of politicians.10 To identify the year when a firm becomes PC, we take maximum 
from the year when a person becomes elected and the year when he takes up a management position 
in a firm. Here, we assume that state of being PC persists over time and starts from the first episode. 
The presence of direct PCs of management is searched only for bankrupt firms. Further, the data set 
of bankrupt firms is merged with the data set on PCs of non bankrupt firms. PCs of non bankrupt 
firms are PCs of oligarchs that own these firms from the study of Guriev and Rachinsky (2005). 
One can doubt whether this approach is valid: bankrupt firms are PC through their managers 
whereas non bankrupt ones through their owners. However, Bonne and Rodionov (2001) argue that 
many firms owned by oligarchy are actually management-owned, i.e. the oligarch is a manager and 
an owner of a firm at the same time. Data on votes for winners and votes for runners-up in guberna-
torial elections is kindly provided by Akhmed Akhmedov. 
Fig. 1 (see Appendix A3) shows dynamics of outcomes of EM procedures in Russia: the number of EM 
initiated; the number of cases when EM firms were liquidated, restored to solvency or ended upon vol-
untary settlement. Solvency restorings account only for 0.7% in 2002 to 4.5% in 1998 out of all EM 
cases in a particular year. Most firms get LQ after EM. Table 1 (see Appendix A4) highlights composi-
tion of firms in our sample. In the second and the third block of Table 1, we present the number of bank-
ruptcy cases initiated by PC and by EM (from our sample): 1998 and 2002 have the greatest number of 
bankruptcy cases initiated, 655 and 278 respectively. Table 2 compares means of variables employed in 
the estimation: non bankrupt firms are significantly more politically connected, have lower leverage ra-
tio, and lower ratio of arrears to assets; LQ firms are significantly less politically connected, have greater 
leverage, and greater ratio of arrears to assets; whereas EM firms lie in the middle. 
4.3. Cox's proportional hazards model 
To estimate the effects of PCs on the timing of bankruptcy and separately on initiation of EM and 
LQ we apply the Cox's (1972) proportional hazards model. This duration model seems to be the 
most appropriate one since it does not require complicated parametric assumptions. 
                                                 
8 AK&M stands for the news agency "Analysis, Consultations and Marketing". 
9 For adjustment, the following automatic procedure is applied: sales can not rise more than 50 times from year to year; 
employment can not jump more than 10 times; sales to employment ratio can not increase 1000 times. 
10 The data set description could be found at http://www.panorama.ru/info/labir.html. 
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One might question the appropriateness on the duration model when static discrete models can per-
fectly tell whether PCs affect probabilities to belong to EM, LQ, or non bankruptcy groups. One 
possible answer is the following: the dynamic dimension of duration models allows to estimate ef-
fects of PCs when other characteristics of firms and institutional environment are changing, e.g. 
firms can accumulate larger arrears, an arbitration court president can change. Moreover, in prac-
tice, most firms have outstanding debts large enough to initiate bankruptcy, so that a bankruptcy 
petition can be filed any time. Therefore, natural question to ask is what affects the timing of the 
bankruptcy petition, in particular, what is the effect of PCs. 
The failure event here is bankruptcy. Further, bankruptcy events could be sorted out into two differ-
ent failures: EM and LQ depending on the first procedure initiated. This classification is important, 
since these two events have completely different consequences for firms: EM keeps them operating; 
LQ closes their operations. Below, we present the basics of duration analysis. 
Hazard ratio is the probability per time unit that a firm that has survived till the beginning of the 
respective interval will fail in that interval, i.e. go bankrupt. 
The Cox's proportional hazards model is a nonparametric duration model which assumes that for 
two different firms the ratio of hazards is constant over time (proportionality assumption):  
 βXethth ′)(=)( 0 , 
where )(th  — hazard ratio at t ; )(0 th  — baseline hazard; X  — matrix of time-varying covariates 
(explanatory variables); β  — vector of coefficients to be estimated. Note that values of covariates 
determine how much the hazard ratio for a particular firm differs from the baseline hazard which is 
the same for all firms in a given moment in time. 
This model is estimated by the Cox's partial likelihood without requiring the baseline hazards to be 
estimated. The following partial log-likelihood function is maximized in order to obtain β:  
 )}]({[=
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where iX  be the row vector of covariates for the time interval 0( , ]i it t  for the i th observation. Here j  
indexes the ordered failure times )( jt  ( = 1,...,j D ), jD  is the set of jd  observations that fail at )( jt , 
jd  is the number of failures at )( jt , and jR  is the set of observations k  that are at risk at time )( jt . 
The Cox's method requires time-varying covariates to be strictly exogenous (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Here, exogeneity assumption seems to be plausible since there is no intuitive pattern of change in 
our explanatory variables with the time passed from the enactment of the 1998 law. We also test for 
the proportionality assumption for both the regression in general and for each independent variable 
in particular. 
We assume that all cases are at risk going bankrupt (EM or LQ) from the year 1998, since the first 
law of 1992 was barely functioning and, overall, firms had very low chances to go bankrupt. 
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An estimate of the PCs' effect is not biased only if the exogeneity of PCs assumption holds. How-
ever, possible endogeneity of PCs is rather an important issue here, i.e. firms may choose to become 
PC or not and, thus, PCs dummy can correlate with the error term in the equation for the hazards 
ratio. In other words, we may end up with positive selection, i.e. "bad" firms become PC expecting 
protection from bankruptcy, or with negative selection, i.e. only "good" firms become PC naturally 
having lower chances of bankruptcy. In the former case we get significantly positive effect of PCs 
on hazards ratio (going bankrupt) not because PCs induce bankruptcy, but because "bad" firms be-
come PC to get protection from bankruptcy and this protection fails; in the latter case the effect may 
be significantly negative, not because PCs strongly protect from bankruptcy, but because "good" 
firms rarely go bankrupt. One way to deal with this problem is to apply instrumental variables (IV) 
technique, i.e. one needs to find a parameter (an instrumental variable) that strongly correlates with 
PCs, but not with the error term in the hazards equation. In other words, the instrumental variable 
must affect the hazards ratio only through its effect on PCs. 
Indeed, endogeneity is an issue in our specification: we can not include sales and employment di-
rectly into the hazards equation, since, as described in the previous section, these variables have dif-
ferent units of measure for different firms. It seems that omitted absolute values of sales and em-
ployment should matter for bankruptcy decisions and chances of being PC. Therefore, to obtain un-
biased estimate of the effect of PCs we need an instrument. 
Estimation strategy with an instrument consists of two stages:11 estimation of a demand equation for 
PCs, where we use probit model; estimation of the Cox's specification employing estimates of PCs 
from the first stage. 
Demand for PCs at time t  is hypothesized to be a latent variable *iT  that depends on covariates 
(characteristics of a firm) from the hazards equation iX  and the instrument iZ . The equation for the 
first stage is:  
 iiii ZXT υαα ++ 21* = ,  
where iυ  is an independent random variable due to unobserved heterogeneity. So, we observe 
PC (indicator for being PC is set to one) only if there is positive demand for PC, or written for-
mally:  
 0>1,= *ii TT . 
The hazards ratio is hypothesized to depend on characteristic of a firm iX  and PCs which is iT :  
 
'
0( ) = ( ) i i
X b T
ih t h t e
θ+ . 
                                                 
11 Strategy follows Yonatan and Beenstock (2005). The effect of vocational training on unemployment duration: estima-
tion by natural experimentation, mimeo. 
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This equation uses the instrumented value for iT . The second stage coefficients are consistent and 
asymptotically normally distributed (Murphy and Topel, 1985). 
We also need a definition of a survivor function that is cumulative proportion of cases surviving up 
to the respective interval. 
4.4. Estimation results 
We begin with the analysis of the timing (duration from 1998) when firms go bankrupt. Fig. 2A 
presents Kaplan–Meier estimator of survivor functions of PC and not PC firms. At first glance, PC 
firms have greater chances not to go bankrupt even if we control for leverage (Fig. 2B). Cox's test 
does not reject difference in survivor functions for PC and not PC firms at 1%. However, PC firms 
can be better on average and therefore have greater chances to avoid insolvency. Therefore, one has 
to control for other firms' characteristics to confirm this tendency. 
Table 3 provides statistics for pre-bankruptcy performance measures of EM and LQ firms. There is 
significantly more PC firms among those that end up in EM. LQ firms have greater leverage, worse 
current liquidity ratio, lower employment growth, and greater tax arrears. 
To apply the IV technique described in the previous section one needs to find a valid instrument. As 
an instrument we suggest to employ political "monopoly" calculated as a ratio of votes for winners 
to votes for runners-up in regional gubernatorial elections. The higher the ratio, i.e. more popular is 
a winning governor, the greater is political "monopoly". That should imply greater stability of po-
litical groups in the regional parliament, so it becomes harder for an outsider to be elected to re-
gional parliament or be appointed to the regional government and easier for an insider to stay. Tests 
for validity of political "monopoly" as an instrument are presented below. 
The first stage equation for demand for PCs in year t  is:  
 1 2 3_ = _" " _it it it it itInstrumented PC X Political monopoly Industry dummiesα α α υ+ + + , (1) 
where itυ  is an independent random variable due to unobserved heterogeneity; itX  is the same set 
of covariates as used at the second stage; _" "itPolitical monopoly  is categorized dummy: 1 if ratio 
of votes for winners to runners-up on last gubernatorial elections is greater than its median value 
(high "monopoly") and 0 if lower (low "monopoly").12 
The second stage is the Cox's model. The proportionality assumption holds for Instrumented PCs at 
10% and for the other estimates reported at 1% significance level. Three presented models have the 
                                                 
12 Kemerovo oblast has the highest level of absolute political "monopoly" 131.75, whereas Novgorod oblast that follows 
next has political "monopoly" 70.46. To introduce greater variation in the instrument, we take categories rather than 
absolute values. However, the results also hold for absolute political "monopoly". 
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same specification ( i  — firms' id, t  — time):  
 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
8 9
( ) = ( ) ( _ _
_ _ ._ _ _
_ _ ),
i it it it
it it it it
it it it
h t h t exp Instrumented PC Leverage Current Liquidity
Cash flows Labor prod growth Employment growth Tax arrears
Wage arrears Trade arrears
α α α
α α α α
α α ε
+ + +
+ + + +
+ + +
 (2) 
where )(thi  — hazards ratio for the firm i  to go bankrupt (EM, LQ) at time t , i.e. probability of 
going bankrupt (EM, LQ) at t  if the firm has not gone bankrupt (EM, LQ) yet; )(0 th  — baseline 
hazards ratio identical for complete sample of firms at time t , i.e. estimated coefficients tell in what 
direction and how much the hazards ratio for an individual firm differs from the baseline hazards 
ratio for all firms. Coefficients are reported in the form )( kbexp  that is the deviation from the base-
line hazards ratio for a one-unit change in kX . 
The list of covariates itX  is the following: itPCedInstrument _  — instrumented value for PCs 
from the first stage; itLeverage  — log of debt to assets ratio; itLiquidityCurrent_  — log of liquid 
assets to short term liabilities; itflowsCash_  — negative log of costs per unit of sales; 
itgrowthprodLabor .__  — log growth in labor productivity; itgrowthEmployment_  — log growth 
in employment; itarrearsTax_  — log tax arrears to total assets ratio; itarrearsWage_  — log wage 
arrears to total assets ratio; itarrearsTrade_  — log trade arrears to total assets ratio; itε  — error 
term. 
Important to mention, if we include industry dummies into the Cox's model then the overall propor-
tionality test and the proportionality test for Instrumented PCs worsens. Moreover, the model's pre-
dictive power does not gain from inclusion of industry dummies. Based on this observation we do 
not include industry dummies into our final specification. 
We examine two possible challenges for instrumental validity of political "monopoly". First, we 
check if PC firms' characteristics are distributed differently when the political "monopoly" is high 
and when the political "monopoly" is low, i.e. patterns for being PC are different under different 
extents of political "monopoly". If they have different distributions, then we get self-selection ac-
cording to political "monopoly" and joint regression will not have much sense. Table 4A examines 
firms' characteristics in regions with high and low political "monopoly". Significant at 1% differ-
ence is found only for leverage, cash flows, and trade arrears. 
Second, after estimating the first stage using probit model for each year, we examine F-statistics for 
the instrument. Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) suggest necessary magnitude for (partial) F-
statistics with one instrument to be 8.96. In Table 4B we report probit estimates for demand for PCs 
and F-statistics for political "monopoly". The political "monopoly" coefficient is everywhere sig-
nificantly negative and its F-statistics varies from 3.18 in 1999 to 14.72 in 2004. So, in half of the 
years our instrument is not a weak instrument and the effect of political "monopoly" follows our 
intuitive prediction. 
Results are consistent with our hypotheses that PCs have negative effect on bankruptcy initia-
tion; and that PCs have negative effect on the timing of LQ but PCs are irrelevant for the tim-
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ing of EM. Table 4C reports estimates of the two stage IV regression. Instrumented PCs have 
no effect on EM timing. However, significantly negative effect on bankruptcy and LQ timing: 
the presence of PCs decreases the baseline hazards by 91% at 1% significance level for bank-
ruptcy, and by 98% at 1% significance level for LQ controlling for firm's insolvency charac-
teristics. 
In particular, the absence of the effect of PCs on EM timing means that this procedure is not costly for 
PC firms; that might happen in the environment of captured judiciary (Lambert-Mogiliansky, Sonin, 
and Zhuravskaya, 2003). Therefore, the main policy implication here is independent judiciary. 
As a robustness check, we run multinomial logit regressions for each year and pooled set: they 
demonstrate significant and correct-sign results confirming different effects of PCs on initiation of 
EM and LQ. However, results are not systematic for different years. 
5. QUEST FOR EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENT 
5.1. Hypotheses 
In this section we present hypotheses about the performance of PC firms under EM. Legal goal of 
EM is solvency restoring, however, Fig. 1 shows that this is rarely the case. Below, we hypothesize 
the ways PC might contribute to this trend. 
:3H  PCs have positive effect on firms' performance under EM. 
EM can provide a politician with time and resources to turn the case in his favor: toning down so-
cial unrest, assets tunnelling, etc. Lambert-Mogiliansky et al. (2003) have shown that there is no 
improvement in efficiency measures following EM in general. Here, we specifically argue for par-
ticular effects of PC EM. 
The key story shows that there could be a bailout in bankruptcy. Indirect arguments for bailouts 
could be revealed by performance measures, e.g. sales. We suggest that PC insolvent firms may 
have different pattern for bankruptcies compared with not PC ones. Stressing social-importance of 
insolvent firms politicians may have greater likelihood to force bailouts and preferential treatment 
for firms they manage. 
Alternatively, PCs might not have an effect on performance measures. It might be rather hard to ask 
a limited regional budget for a bailout of an individual insolvent firm: it should depend on the ex-
tent of political interest in that firm; and the key story might be just an exception. 
:4H  No decrease in employment following EM irrespective of the presence of direct PCs. 
Lambert-Mogiliansky et al. (2003) present evidence that there is no change in employment follow-
ing EM. In addition, this hypothesis is supported by the politicians-and-firms story not only in the 
case of PC firms: regional politicians can benefit from preserving employment in their regions. 
Moreover, bankruptcy law itself facilitates EM initiation in socially-important firms: the law au-
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thorizes courts to impose EM irrespective of creditors' decisions if municipal, regional, or federal 
authorities appeal for EM initiation in order to protect local employment. 
Another possibility would be that only the direct influence of PC firms makes EM avoid employ-
ment cuts. Then, one should obtain greater absolute positive effect of PC EM on employment com-
pared with negative effect of EM. 
5.2. Dynamic panel with fixed effects 
To estimate the effects of PC EM and EM on performance measures we apply fixed effects dynamic 
panel with the Arellano–Bond estimation technique.  
 itiitppititit bXaYaYY εµ +++++ −− ...= 11 , 
= 1, ...,i N , = 1, ..., it T ; 1a , ..., pa , b  — parameters to be estimated; itX  — k×1  vector of strictly 
exogenous covariates; iµ  — individual component; itε  — iid  over the whole sample. 
Assumption: iµ  and itε  are independent for each i  over all t . 
Assumption: No autocorrelation in itε . 
Therefore, it is necessary to verify the hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation of a certain order 
in residuals. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) derived a GMM estimator using lagged levels of the dependent variable 
and differences of the strictly exogenous variables to estimate dynamic model. Dynamic nature of 
the specification does not allow to apply regular fixed effects regression since endogeneity brings 
inconsistency of estimates. 
This specification is employed for the following performance measures: sales, employment, and 
labor productivity. Importantly, different firms' balance sheets report sales and employment in dif-
ferent units, e.g. hundreds, thousands, and millions. So, in order to pull measurement units (differ-
ent for every firm) into fixed effects we take logs of these variables since taking logs makes meas-
urement units be additive. Different units of measure are not relevant in the previous section since 
we use only ratios there and measurement units cancel out. 
To perform robustness checks we apply: the regular fixed effects regression with clustering by 
firms' id and the MNR13 method. The MNR method was first employed in studying effects of priva-
tization by Megginson, Nash, and Randenborgh (1994). We take their idea and alter the test for 
some of our variables that have different units of measure for different firms. The MNR procedure 
is the following: (i) take means for pre- and post-performance measures (year when an event hap-
pens is excluded, at least two pre-, post-observations must be available); (ii) apply Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test for significant change in absolute values of dimensionless variables or, alterna-
                                                 
13 I am grateful to Sergei Guriev for his advice to try this method. 
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tively, t-test for growth rates adjusted for overall economic growth to the equality of its mean to 
unity, to test for the direction of the change. 
5.3. Estimation results 
In this subsection we turn to the empirical study of the effects of PCs on firms' performance under 
EM. We specify the dynamic model with fixed effects. This specification assumes that sales, em-
ployment and labor productivity are AR processes. The model is the following:  
 1 1 2 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9
= _ _
_ _ _ ,
it it it it it it it it
it t i it
Y Y Y PC EM LQ PC EM PC LQ
LQ after EM Year dummies
α α α α α α α
α α µ ε
− −+ + + + + + +
+ + + +  (3) 
where itY  — dependent variable: log sales, log labor productivity, log employment; 1−itY  2−itY  — its 
lagged values (one period and two periods back); itPC  — dummy for being PC: 0 — when a firm is 
not PC, 1 — from the year a firm becomes PC, i.e. a CEO or a member of an executive board be-
comes a member of parliament or a top executive at the federal, regional, or municipal level, and 
on; itEM  — dummy for being EM: 0 — if a firm is not under EM, 1 — if a firm is under EM, i.e. 
itEM  is 1 from the year when EM is initiated till the year when EM ends;
14 itLQ  — dummy for be-
ing LQ: 0 — if a firm is not under LQ, 1 — from the year when LQ was initiated and on;15 
ititit EMPCEMPC ⋅=_  — dummy for PC EM: 1 — if EM firm is PC, 0 — otherwise; 
ititit LQPCLQPC ⋅=_  — dummy for PC LQ: 1 — if LQ firm is PC, 0 — otherwise (PC firms are 
likely to be large ones and, therefore, longer stay under observation of the RERLD, so that we may 
observe the complete fall in their performance under LQ); itEMafterLQ __  — dummy for being LQ 
after EM (EM firms might be large and, therefore, stay under observation longer so we may capture 
the complete fall). 
In this specification, coefficient by a dummy variable should be interpreted as an approximation of 
a percentage change in an outcome variable that follows dummy change. 
The choice of the number of lags in specifications for the dynamic panels was made based on 
Arellano–Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of a certain order is 0. All regressions 
are AR(2) processes. 
The first column of Table 5 reports estimation results for log sales. The coefficient of PC EM is in-
significant. In addition, EM dummy is also insignificant. The first column of Table 6 reports results 
of estimation for log labor productivity. In general, estimates exhibit the same pattern as in log of 
                                                 
14 While composing the data set for EM firms we made the assumption that if firms do not go into LQ (that provides us 
with the explicit year when EM ends) then EM is assumed to last for two years. Two years is the most common duration 
of EM, but in the case of socially-important firms the duration can be up to 10 years (law 1998) or 3 years (law 2002). 
15 There is no obligatory official publications upon the completion of LQ. Here we assumed that firms get closed if LQ 
is initiated. However, in practice, firms can escape closure by singing a voluntary settlement with creditors. 
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sales equation. Again, dummies for PC EM are irrelevant for labor productivity. Therefore, the third 
hypothesis about effects of PCs on bankruptcy outcomes is rejected, i.e. PC EM does not matter for 
EM performance of firms, whereas we hypothesized positive effect. 
Interestingly, we obtain negative robust sign for PCs alone in case of log labor productivity: 
15% average drop in labor productivity compared with non PC firms. Important to note, that 
EM itself does not bring any efficiency improvements in terms of log sales and log labor pro-
ductivity. This result strongly contradicts the goal of EM stated in the law: restructuring and 
solvency restoring. 
However, the bailout in the key story leads to the increase in efficiency: growth in labor productiv-
ity and sales. According to the estimation results, direct PCs, in general, are irrelevant for the effi-
ciency-enhancing EM. Therefore, in our case the bailout might be just a consequence of being a so-
cially-important (a company-town) firm, rather than PC EM. 
Finally, results for log employment are reported in the first column of Table 7. According to the 
forth hypothesis we expect to find irrelevance of direct PCs for employment cuts and nonnegative 
effect of EM. Indeed, PC EM is insignificant. 
Results in Table 7 can be attributed to the fact that EM might be imposed under the specific condi-
tion of no employment cuts, whereas efficiency might require more aggressive employment cuts 
compared with not EM firms. Therefore, the forth hypothesis is not rejected: EM has nonnegative 
effect and direct PCs are irrelevant for employment. This estimation goes in line with the politi-
cians-and-firms scenario: EM firms preserve employment thereby impairing labor productivity. PC 
EM firms are not different from their non PC counterparts. 
Officials who commented the key anecdote stressed as a success the ability of the firm to prevent 
drop in employment. Interestingly, it is also pointed out that the foremost EM's goal was to prevent 
employment cuts. 
Overall, this section results imply that EM procedure should be revised significantly. For instance, 
one important concern is that large EM firms are not able to get through restructuring fast, that EM 
procedure is too short for a significant change to be made. Therefore, possible policy recommenda-
tion, that is complimentary to court independence and efficient monitoring of bankruptcy adminis-
trators, is increasing the EM term for large firms with high sunk costs. 
5.4. Robustness checks 
Robustness checks were performed for the model's specifications, different sub-samples, winsorized 
at 1% and 99% financial ratios,16 and different definitions of explanatory variables. All results are 
robust to winsorized at 1% and 99% financial ratios. 
                                                 
16 To obtain winsorized sample at 1% and 99% we shift all the observations beyond 1% and 99% to the 1- and 99-
percentile respectively. 
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The fixed effects panel estimation with clustering on firms' id as explanatory variables included: PC 
dummy, EM dummy, LQ dummy, PC EM dummy (or alternatively PC before EM and PC after 
EM), PC LQ dummy, LQ EM dummy, lagged log sales (or alternatively log employment), lagged 
log of leverage, lagged log of current liquidity, lagged log of cash flows, lagged log of tax arrears to 
total assets ratio, lagged log of trade arrears to total assets ratio, lagged log of wage arrears to total 
assets ratio, year dummies. In other words, we include all available controls as for the Cox's estima-
tion and log sales (log employment). 
All results that are related to our hypotheses testing are robust: PC EM are irrelevant for the EM 
performance; EM has nonnegative effect on employment. Results are also robust if we consider the 
sub-sample of only non bankrupt and externally managed firms. This results are reported in Ta-
bles 5–7. 
Insignificant result for PC EM might be driven by the fact that PCs that emerged before initiation of EM 
are more continuation-biased: have positive effect; and PCs that emerged after initiation of EM are more 
expropriation-biased: have negative effect. To capture this possibility we include dummies for PC be-
fore EM and PC after EM. Tables 5–7 report estimation results: no significant effect is found. 
6. EXTERNAL MANAGEMENT IN THE UDMURT REPUBLIC: DEBT REPAYMENT 
6.1. Hypotheses 
This section presents final empirical results. From the first two sections we know that there is evi-
dence for the capture of judiciary by politicians, since PCs postpone LQ initiation and do not have 
an effect on the timing of EM initiation. Further, there is no efficiency improvement following EM. 
Therefore, the last question to ask is to what extent EM influence the total debt repayment in bank-
ruptcy. This section discusses this issue. 
Absolute priority rule as it stated in the Russian bankruptcy law implies very low main debt repay-
ment (debt in place before bankruptcy) to unsecured creditors.17 At the same time, the extent and 
the nature of administrative expenses that emerged in bankruptcy and paid-out-first are very hard to 
challenge in court. Therefore, unsecured creditors might have an incentive to opt for external man-
agement (EM) to become the administrative expenses claimants in the course of the procedure. De-
spite that increase in administrative expenses leads to low ultimate repayment of the main debt, for 
a particular unsecured creditor administrative expenses repayments might outweigh losses in the 
probabilistic repayment of the main debt. In other words, unsecured creditors may have an incentive 
to vote for EM at the cost of a decrease in repayment of the main debt. 
Further, the administrative-expenses scenario presented above can be also altered to describe 
preferential treatment in liquidation (LQ) of one creditor at the expense of the others. However, 
                                                 
17 Under the 1998 bankruptcy law unsecured creditors get repaid the last, whereas under 2002 law they share turn with 
state claims (commonly the largest claimant). 
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EM deserves special discussion since it offers greater threats of abuse: longer time horizon, the 
firm's operation under external manager's control, stay on assets, etc. That suggests the following 
hypotheses. 
5H : Concentrated debt (low number of creditors) has positive effect on initiation of EM. 
Low number of creditors implies less checks from rivals. Most likely, absence of the party who is 
interested in monitoring law compliance makes it easier to inflate administrative costs or strip as-
sets in EM. Important to note that EM is very time-consuming and can be prolonged. There is a 
number of cases when unsecured creditors challenged the nature of administrative expenses in 
EM. Despite that the most of the time these claims fail they might provide some limitations for 
manipulation. 
Alternatively, positive effect of low debt concentration on EM initiation might imply less conflict 
about the future of the firm. Absence of the conflict may provide greater chances for making the 
most efficient choice, in terms of greater debt repayment, and EM may represent this choice. In or-
der, to test whether EM indeed provides the highest debt repayment the next hypothesis is sug-
gested. 
6H : EM leads to low overall debt repayment in bankruptcy. 
High administrative costs might lead to low repayment of the main debt if the firm stays unprofit-
able. However, low repayment might also manifest not the evil of EM but just inefficiency of the 
present procedure: EM term is too short for the firm to be restructured. Therefore, under EM the 
firm operates in the same way that led it to bankruptcy: keeps accumulating debts and covers opera-
tional costs out-of-turn leaving less resources for restructuring and satisfaction of creditors' claims. 
In other words, negative effect of EM manifests overall inefficiency of the procedure in protection 
of creditor's claims not specifically for the story described above. 
In order to test the administrative-expenses scenario we assume that unsecured creditors vote effi-
ciently, i.e. vote for the procedure under which they have higher probability of the total debt repay-
ment. The first creditors' meeting vote outcome should determine the procedure (EM or LQ) that is 
to be initiated, however, bankruptcy law states that court, under certain circumstances, may not fol-
low the decision of the first creditors' meeting and initiate the procedure it considers efficient. We 
have data on how five largest unsecured creditors voted, what procedure was initiated, and whether 
the main debt was repayed to a particular unsecured creditor. The main debt might constitute only a 
part of the total debt to this particular creditor, whereas the other part might also include administra-
tive expenses claims. 
Further, we assume a tradeoff between the repayment of the administrative expenses part and the 
repayment of the main debt to an unsecured creditor. Therefore, depending on the structure of the 
creditor's total debt we have different effects of the creditor's desired procedure initiation (that the 
creditor voted for) on the repayment of his main debt. On one hand, if his main debt is the only debt 
that constitutes his total debt then only positive effect of creditor's desired procedure initiation on 
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repayment of his main debt is expected. On the other hand, if his total debt also includes administra-
tive expenses claims than this effect might be negative, so that the creditor sacrifices repayment of 
his main debt for out-of-turn claims (administrative expenses). 
The next step is to discuss the administrative expenses issue. Collusion with the judge (or the 
bankruptcy administrator who can persuade the judge in the efficiency of a particular procedure) 
might be needed in order to secure some share of administrative expenses, since administrative 
expenses is the flow in bankruptcy. In collusion, judge can initiate the procedure that benefits the 
creditor, if needed, through the court's discretion. Therefore, in the case of the collusion and the 
presence of the tradeoff introduced above, the creditor votes for the procedure that ultimately de-
creases his repayment of the main debt but guarantees a portion in administrative expenses. As a 
consequence, the procedure is initiated to inflate administrative expenses that adversely affects 
repayments to the other creditors, i.e. weakens overall protection of creditors rights. In other 
words, while voting the creditor knows composition of his total debt which is, in case of collu-
sion, his administrative expenses debt plus his main debt. As a result, if the administrative-
expenses scenario holds than the creditor's desired procedure which was initiated through the 
court's discretion (overruling the first creditor's meeting decision) should have a negative effect 
on the repayment of his main debt. 
7H : The creditor's desired procedure initiated by the court's discretion has negative effect on the 
repayment of his main debt. 
In order to test these hypotheses we apply logit model. 
6.2. Data 
The data for this part of the study was collected in the arbitration court of the Udmurt Republic. Fi-
nancial data comes from the bankruptcy administrator's reports. It is important to note, that data in 
balance sheets and data reported by administrators are not always the same. In order to stick to a 
uniform pattern data was collected exclusively from administrator's reports. Financial data was col-
lected in the end of the supervision stage for every firm. We also collect the data on the share of 
debt of the first eleven largest creditors (five secured, five unsecured, and the state), subjective as-
sessments on the status of firms (e.g. unique producers, company-towns, etc.), general voting and 
repayment information. 
Figs 4A and 4B present the industry composition of firms under LQ and EM in our sample. Agricul-
ture and construction industries have the greatest number of firms both under EM and under LQ. 
However, housing services have the greatest number of firms under EM alone. Figs 5A and 5B show 
petitioners composition. Interesting to note that FSFO is the leading petitioner both for firms under 
EM and for firms under LQ, whereas self-initiated bankruptcy takes the second place under both pro-
cedures. Further, Table 8 contrasts the characteristics of EM and LQ firms. There are significantly 
more company-towns among EM firms. Firms under LQ have more creditor-initiated bankruptcy pro-
cedures. LQ firms also have larger arrears and debt compared to EM firms. What is more, average 
number of creditors under EM is 4 whereas average number of creditors under LQ is 24. 
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
 
 
26
6.3. Estimation results 
This subsection presents the results of the logit estimation. As robustness checks, we run the same 
specifications using three different samples: (1) full sample of firms; (2) winsorized at 5- and  
95-percentile financial ratios and Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, when all the observations beyond  
5- and 95-percentile are placed on the 5- and 95-points accordingly; (3) sample where all observa-
tions with financial ratios and Herfindahl–Hirschman Index beyond 5- and 95-percentile are 
dropped. Financial data employed in these regressions is from the end of the supervision period. 
Firstly, in order to test the first hypothesis about the effect of debt concentration on initiation of EM 
we apply the following logit specification:  
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+
+ + + + +
 (4) 
where F is a logistic function; i  — firm's id; and j = {0,1}: 0 if LQ is initiated right after supervi-
sion, 1 if EM is initiated. 
The list of covariates is the following: iIndexHirschmanHerfindahl _−  — debt concentration: sum 
of squared shares of ten largest creditors and the state in the total debt (the higher it is the more con-
centrated the debt is); iinitiatedCreditor −  — dummy for the petitioner:18 1 — if a creditor was a peti-
tioner, 0 — otherwise; iinitiatedSelf −  — dummy for the petitioner: 1 — if a debtor was a peti-
tioner, 0 — otherwise; iownershipMunicipal_  — dummy for municipal share: 0 — no municipal 
ownership; 1 — non-zero municipal ownership; ioutcomeVoting_  — outcome of the first creditor's 
meeting voting: sum of votes weighted by the share of debt for the first five largest unsecured, se-
cured creditors, and the state (where negative range is pro-LQ and positive range is pro-EM); 
itLeverage  — log of debt to assets ratio; itLiquidityCurrent_  — log of liquid assets to short term 
liabilities; itflowsCash_  — negative log of costs per unit of sales; iarrearsTax_ , iarrearsCredit_  — 
the share of arrears in sales; iFSFOofAbsence __  — dummy that indicates whether FSFO is operat-
ing: 0 — before the 2004 when FSFO was liquidated, 1 — since 2004 (including) when FRS sys-
tem was established. 
Marginal effects are presented in Table 9. Indeed, as it was hypothesized concentration of debt in-
creases the probability of EM initiation by 13% at 1% significance level. Effects of the rest signifi-
cant controls are intuitive. Creditor-initiated procedures are more LQ-biased, i.e. decrease probabil-
ity of EM by 12% comparing to the cases when bankruptcy was initiated not by creditors. Voting 
outcome indeed goes in line with the procedure initiated, but appears to be not decisive. Tax and 
                                                 
18 Here the comparison group is bankruptcy initiated by FSFO or Tax service. 
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credit arrears have negative effect. Therefore, the first hypothesis about debt concentration is not 
rejected at 1% significance level. However, that might not exclusively manifest the administrative-
expenses scenario. 
For testing 6H  that EM reduces total debt repayment, we apply the logit model. Despite the fact 
that the total debt repayment is a continuous variable, it has just a few observations between 0 and 1 
which is no debt repayment and full debt repayment. So, it seems reasonable to make it discrete 
choice variable: low and high repayment:  
 
1 2 3
4 5 6 7
8 9
{ _ _ = } = { _
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i i
Pr Total debt repayment j F EM Herfindahl Hirschman Index
Leverage Current liquidity Cash flows Employment
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 (5) 
where F is a logistic function; i  — firm's id; and j = {0,1}: 0 in case of low debt repayment and 1 
in case of high debt repayment, i.e. ratio of total repayment to total debt is lower or higher than its 
median. 
New variable here is court's discretion. We do not have data on the actual court's discretion, i.e. 
whether the decision of the first creditors' meeting was actually overruled. However, we can proxy 
it. We have data on shares in the total debt and vote of the five largest unsecured creditors, five 
largest secured creditors, and the state. Therefore, we are able to calculate the voting outcome for 
these eleven largest creditors and find out if the initiated procedure is in line with the voting out-
come or not, if not then we label this state as discretion. Note that we do not include industry con-
trols in the final specification, since they bring no new information. 
Table 10 presents the results of estimation. Indeed, EM has the robust and significant at 1% effect 
on the total debt repayment— increase in the likelihood of low debt repayment by 21%. 
Finally, to test the hypotheses 7H  we apply the following logit specification:  
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Pr Main debt repayment j F EM Herfindahl Hirschman Index
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 (6) 
where F is a logistic function; i  — firm's id; and j = {0,1}: 0 in the case of no or partial main debt 
repayment to the unsecured creditor and 1 in case of full main debt repayment. There are three new 
covariates: iDebt , iprocedureDesired_ , and icreditoroffavorindiscretionstCour _____′ . iDebt  is 
the share of unsecured creditor in the total unsecured debt that emerged before bankruptcy (the 
main debt), it is also the weight given to the vote of the creditor on the first creditor's meeting. The 
higher is the iDebt  the harder it is for the creditor to be fully repaid, but at the same time the credi-
tor's opinion is more influential. iprocedureDesired_  is a dummy: 0 if not the procedure for which 
the creditor voted for was initiated, 1 if the procedure for which the creditor voted for was initiated. 
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icreditoroffavorindiscretionstCour _____′  is a dummy: 0 if the desired procedure initiated not under 
the court's discretion, 1 if the desired procedure is initiated under the court's discretion. The rest of 
explanatory variables have the same definitions as before and are included as controls for the finan-
cial health (financial ratios), the size of the firm (employment), the bankruptcy institutional envi-
ronment (absence of FSFO), the firm's (industry) and the procedure's (EM) specific characteristics. 
Table 11 presents the results. Each firm has several unsecured creditors, therefore, we can not treat 
creditors of the same firm as independent observations, so we perform clustering on firms' id. The 
only two significant coefficients are flowCash_ , incremental increase in which brings 5% increase 
in the probability of the main debt being fully repaid, and procedureDesired_ , where switch from 
the non-desired to the desired procedure brings a 6% increase in the probability of the main debt 
being repaid. icreditoroffavorindiscretionstCour _____′  is insignificant. That means that the seventh 
hypothesis about the administrative-expenses scenario is rejected since it suggests significantly 
negative effect of court's discretion. However, we reject this hypothesis under the assumption of the 
tradeoff between the repayment of administrative expenses and the repayment of the main debt to a 
particular creditor; therefore, if there is no tradeoff than inflation of administrative expenses by the 
creditor might not affect his main debt repayment. 
To summarize, the arbitration court data provides evidence that EM is initiated in firms with low 
concentration of debt, and EM indeed negatively affects the probability of high total debt repay-
ment. Further, there is no evidence that court's discretion brings inflation of administrative expenses 
in favor of a particular unsecured creditor under the assumption of the tradeoff. In light of the low 
total debt repayment brought about by EM, it seems that bankruptcy procedure in Russia should be 
liquidation-biased in order to enhance protection of creditors rights. 
7. CONCLUSION 
Our main findings highlight the three important aspects of the external management procedure:  
(1) its initiation; (2) performance; and (3) debt repayment. Firstly, political connections indeed mat-
ter for the timing of liquidation but they are irrelevant for the timing of external management. The 
probability of external management initiation increases with debt concentration. Secondly, the re-
sults do not reject the hypothesis that externally managed firms protect local employment, thereby 
impairing labor productivity. This result, it should be noted, is obtained irrespective of whether or 
not the externally managed firm has direct political connections or not. This evidence is in line with 
the politicians-and-firms story by Sleifer and Vishny (1994). And thirdly, external management has 
negative impact on the total debt repayment, however, we do not find evidence for the inflation of 
the administrative expenses in the interests of a particular unsecured creditor. 
Thus, the estimation results provide the following evidence. Politically connected firms avoid liqui-
dation and are indifferent to external management. This may be a sign of captured courts (see Lam-
bert-Mogiliansky, Sonin and Zhuravskaya, 2003). Externally managed firms have higher debt con-
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centration that implies absence of control from rival creditors and greater threats of manipulation. 
Furthermore, politically connected firms neither restructure nor get bailed out under external man-
agement. Moreover, external management prevents employment cuts, irrespective of the presence 
of direct political connections. Therefore, in general, politically connected firms utilize the bank-
ruptcy procedure to forward various aims except obtaining a bailout, e.g. debt cancelling, employ-
ment protection or ownership change. Moreover, nonparametric robustness checks do not reject the 
hypothesis that politically connected externally managed firms even experience decreases in sales 
and labor productivity. As a result, externally managed firms have lower total debt repayment that 
weakens investor protection. 
Some limitations of our empirical investigation should be mentioned. We implicity assume that po-
litical connections are persistent over time for each firm. Thus, a firm defined to be politically con-
nected from the year in which the first top manager is elected and on. Furthermore, the quality of 
balance sheet data frequently rises concerns in empirical studies: some taxable value often seems 
underreported. In our case, however, we argue that the sales figures that we are using are not under 
the threat of underreporting since they are reported net of all taxes. However, firms may want to 
conceal true figures from their competitors. Next, there is a different bankruptcy regime (set of pe-
culiarities at each bankruptcy stage) for large firms that have high employment. We do take account 
of different regimes19 as we employ fixed effects panel estimation. Unfortunately, we are not able to 
trace firm movements in between the categories, e.g. from the not socially-important category to the 
socially-important one. 
Overall, obtained empirical results urge for a drastic change in the current bankruptcy legislation. 
External management procedure must be significantly altered: absence of court's discretion, in-
crease in term for large firms, independent judiciary. It seems that the last change, the most crucial 
one, is very hard to implement at once. Therefore, we join Berglof, Bolton, Guriev, and 
Zhuravskaya (2006) in their argument for liquidation-biased bankruptcy for Russia.  
                                                 
19 Natural monopolies and strategic firms also have their own regimes. 
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APPENDICES 
A1. Institutional background: bankruptcy monitoring bodies 
The Federal Bankruptcy Service for Financial Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy (FSFO), liquidated 
under the Administrative reform in the spring of 2004, was the first body responsible for licensing 
and monitoring bankruptcy administrators. It also was authorized to present evidence of abuse in 
court. However, suits against administrators were not a common practice. For instance, dismissal of 
the corrupt external manager happened only once in the Udmurt Republic. Nevertheless, FSFO was 
recognized to play a disciplinary role for administrators in this region: most of the creditors' meet-
ings were held with FSFO's participation (often FSFO official prevented overspending of debtor's 
assets by administrators), administrators were to present reports to FSFO. 
However, FSFO practices were not uniform over the country. The FSFO's classification of licences 
for bankruptcy administrators provoked great discontent. Licences for administrators had three 
classes. The third-class license was feasible mainly for FSFO members and entitled its owner to 
manage large, socially-important firms. For instance, there was the conflict about the external man-
agement position in Sidanko (oil company) when FSFO insisted that Sidanko is a socially-important 
firm and must be managed by administrator with the 3rd class license whereas the current adminis-
trator had only the 2nd class license. However, there was no administrator with the 3rd class license 
in Russia for the moment, so FSFO claimed that the second best is to appoint a FSFO's member for 
that position (Segodnia, 1999). Later, Higher court abolished this classification (Rossyiskaya ga-
zeta, 2001). There was other evidence of corruption of FSFO when its members had the privilege to 
manage socially-important firms in interests of particular creditors: Novosibirsky Electrodnyi plant, 
Orsko-Halilivsky metallurgic plant, Stupinsky metallurgic plant, etc. Corruption was one of the 
main reasons for the liquidation of FSFO. 
The 2002 law created a new body for monitoring bankruptcy administrators that is a recognized 
self-regulated organization of bankruptcy administrators. The Federal Registration Service (FRS) 
is authorized to monitor self-regulated organizations of bankruptcy administrators nowadays. 
While the self-regulated organization itself is entitled to monitor its members (§  22 of the 2002 
bankruptcy law). There was not yet any action of FRS against administrators in Udmurtia. Anec-
dotal evidence argues that the self-regulated body does not do much better in monitoring adminis-
trators and just worsened incentives for them. It is important to note that the self-regulated or-
ganization must present the list consisting of three candidates (so-called "triple", §  45 the 2002 
bankruptcy law) on the arbitration court request. Then the court appoints a bankruptcy administra-
tor out of the candidates from the list.20 One can be curious about the ways for administrators get-
ting into a "triple". 
                                                 
20 The top candidate always preferred over the lower ranked one. 
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It is important to note that the liability of administrators for the possible harm to creditors or debtors 
must be insured under the 2002 bankruptcy law. However, there are very few cases of insurance 
payments. Despite that one of the primary goals for liquidation of FSFO was reduction in bureau-
cratic burden and corruption, monitoring of administrators in essence by themselves increased the 
risk of manipulation. 
A2. External management in the Udmurt Republic: success stories 
Case study 1: MUP Izhevsky hlebozavod 3 (Bread-making plant) 
FSFO filed for bankruptcy in the May of 2001 with three-year tax arrears 600 thousands RUR 
(20 thousands USD). The firm had 25 subsidiaries and 500 employees. There were four criminal 
cases against subsidiaries for tax nonpayments, but since it is a municipal firm the criminal cases 
were closed and subsidiaries liquidated (debts were not paid back). FSFO opted for external man-
agement of MUP. First three months of external management were devoted to evaluation of the fi-
nancial performance. In the forth month the firm was sold to the group of investors conditional on 
paying out the debts, and restructuring (buying new equipment). The book value of the firm was 2.3 
mln. RUR (77 thousands USD) without subsidiaries, but the firm was sold for 700 thousands RUR 
(23 thousands USD) with subsidiaries. The latest reports show that the firm was reorganized into 
the joint-stock company with limited liability OOO Izhevsky hlebozavid 3, subsidiaries stayed 
within the firm, tax arrears are paid back in full, no change in equipment. 
Case study 2: OOO Votkinsky minispirtzavid (Alcohol) 
FSFO filed for bankruptcy in the December of 2002 with tax arrears 500 thousands RUR (17 thou-
sands USD). The firm employed 300 people in the town with 50 thousands in population. The diffi-
culties started after 1998 crises, when competition with other republican alcohol firms became 
stronger. The municipality owned 37% of shares and management positions were mainly occupied 
by government affiliates. External management was initiated. The credit line for restructuring was 
opened by Impexbank for 10 years. New equipment was purchased; management team was re-
placed. The voluntary agreement was signed after 8 month of external management. The latest re-
port (2006) shows that all the debts and Impexbank's credit are repaid in full. The firm is reorgan-
ized into the joint-stock company with limited liability OOO Vizavi. 
Case study 3: MUP Rechnoi port Sarapul (Transportation: river port) 
FSFO filed for bankruptcy in the November of 2002 with tax and wage arrears. The firm received 
subsidies from regional budget for restructuring: maintenance of the port's building, new equip-
ment, rising the level of staff's skills, new business partners. Today, most of Sarapul residents use 
its services. In two years, solvency is restored, tax and wage arrears are cancelled. Operations are 
still not profitable, but taxes and wages are timely paid.  
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A3. Figures 
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Fig. 1. Number of external management procedures and their outcomes 
Note: Horizontal axis shows years and time periods for a particular bankruptcy law. Percentage of externally managed firms out of all 
bankrupt firms is by the year it corresponds to. Vertical axis shows the absolute number of procedures in given year in particular 
category: external management (EM), firms liquidated (LQ) after external management (EM), firms signed voluntary settlement in 
EM, firms restored to solvency in EM. There is no official statistics available for a number of firms that were liquidated after external 
management starting from 2001. 
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Fig. 2A. Survivor function estimator for bankruptcy of politically connected and not politically 
connected firms 
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 Survivor functions, by dpc adjusted for lev 
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Fig. 2B. Survivor function estimator for bankruptcy of politically connected and not politically 
connected firms adjusted for leverage (lev) 
Note: dpc is a dummy for being politically connected: 1 if a firm is politically connected, 0 otherwise. 
 VAR Observations m_b > m_a m_b < m_a m_b != m_a 
Sales  321 
Employment 321 DECREASE 
Labor productivity 309 
Leverage 126 INCREASE 
NO CHANGE 
NO CHANGE 
NO CHANGE 
NO CHANGE  
Fig. 3A. MNR analysis results for external management 
 
 VAR Observations m_b > m_a m_b < m_a m_b != m_a 
Sales  29 DECREASE NO CHANGE 
Employment 29 DECREASE NO CHANGE 
Labor productivity 28 DECREASE NO CHANGE 
Leverage 22 INCREASE NO CHANGE  
Fig. 3B. MNR analysis results for external management, when a firm was politically connected before the procedure 
 
 VAR Observations m_b > m_a m_b < m_a m_b != m_a 
Sales  254 NO CHANGE 
Employment 254 DECREASE NO CHANGE
Labor productivity 250 NO CHANGE 
Leverage 22 INCREASE NO CHANGE  
Fig. 3C. MNR analysis results for external management, when a firm was not politically connected be-
fore the procedure 
Note: m_b — mean before external management was imposed; m_a — mean after initiation of external manage-
ment; cell is highlighted if hypothesis is not rejected at 5% significance level. 
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Data set industry composition of EM firms in Udmurt Republic 
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Fig. 4A. Industry composition for EM firms in the Udmurt republic, 75 total 
 
 
 
Data set industry composition of LQ firms in Udmurt Republic 
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Fig. 4B. Industry composition for LQ firms in the Udmurt republic, 261 total 
Note: Horizontal axis shows the number of fims. 
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 Data set composition of plaintiffs of EM firms in Udmurt Republic 
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Fig. 5A. Plaintiffs composition for EM firms in the Udmurt republic, 82 total 
 Data set composition of plaintiffs of LQ firms in Udmurt Republic 
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Fig. 5B. Plaintiffs composition for LQ firms in the Udmurt republic, 288 total 
Note: Horizontal axis shows the number of firms. 
 VAR Obs m_b> m_a m_b < m_a m_b != m_a 
Leverage 51 INCREASE NO CHANGE 
Current liquidity 61 INCREASE NO CHANGE 
Cash flow 80 INCREASE NO CHANGE
Fixed assets 52 INCREASE NO CHANGE 
Accounts receivable 80 NO CHANGE 
Wage arrears 80 NO CHANGE 
Tax arrears 80 DECREASE NO CHANGE 
Trade arrears 80 DECREASE NO CHANGE 
Credit arrears 80 NO CHANGE 
Sales 80 NO CHANGE 
Labor prod. 72 NO CHANGE
Employment 72 NO CHANGE 
Debt 82 NO CHANGE  
Fig. 6. MNR analysis results for external management in UR 
Note: m_b — mean before external management was imposed; m_a — mean after initiation of external management; 
m_b >  m_a is highlighted if hypothesis is not rejected at 5% significance level. 
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A4. Tables 
Table 1. Data set composition  
Firms by PC Initiated BNKR by PC Initiated BNKR by EM 
Year 
NOT PC PC Total NOT PC PC before PC after NOT EM EM Total 
1995 3155 164 3319 14 0 7 0 21 21 
1996 3982 246 4228 48 1 3 1 51 52 
1997 3460 344 3804 205 14 18 103 134 237 
1998 3214 438 3652 609 22 24 369 286 655 
1999 3186 560 3746 28 7 3 0 38 38 
2000 3070 600 3670 110 4 2 94 22 116 
2001 2752 612 3364 179 11 2 163 29 192 
2002 2520 614 3134 261 15 2 242 36 278 
2003 712 542 1254 15 5 0 11 9 20 
2004 658 536 1194 17 2 0 12 7 19 
Total 26709 4656 31365 1486 81 61 995 633 1628 
Note: 'Firms by PC': NOT PC — not politically connected firms; PC — politically connected firms; 'Initiated BNKR by PC': NOT 
PC — not politically connected firms where bankruptcy is initiated in given year; PC before — firms that are politically connected 
before bankruptcy initiation in given year ; PC after — firms that become politically connected after bankruptcy initiation in given 
year ; 'Initiated BNKR by EM': NOT EM — liquidation initiated in given year (without EM preceding LQ); EM — external man-
agement initiated in given year. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics  
Variable Observations Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Non BNKR 
PC 26021 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Leverage 9557 –0.98 0.95 –11.41 13.11 
Current liquidity 9551 –0.05 0.8 –13.98 6.92 
Cash flows 10604 0.07 0.54 –10.5 8.12 
Sales growth 14865 –0.15 0.79 –3.9 5.96 
Labor product. growth 14755 –0.06 0.75 –4.33 7.47 
Employment growth 14765 –0.09 0.37 –4.82 2.45 
Tax arrears 7900 –2.96 1.67 –14.1 7.4 
Trade arrears 7870 –2.31 1.26 –12.64 7.14 
Wage arrears 7752 –4.75 1.56 –14.7 4.57 
EM 
PC 1460 0.1 0.31 0 1 
Leverage 797 –0.72 0.76 –3.15 5.97 
Current liquidity 796 –0.54 0.68 –3.25 1.99 
Cash flows 836 –0.08 0.4 –3.63 2.88 
Sales growth 1048 –0.17 0.88 –3.83 4.03 
Labor product. growth 1035 0.01 0.82 –3.43 4.87 
Employment growth 1038 –0.18 0.39 –3.16 1.35 
Tax arrears 775 –1.97 1.3 –7.48 12.38 
Trade arrears 773 –2.03 1.23 –8.91 13.14 
Wage arrears 775 –4.4 1.47 –9.12 12.2 
LQ 
PC 3884 0.04 0.2 0 1 
Leverage 445 –0.36 0.9 –3.6 4.77 
Current liquidity 445 –0.7 1 –5.69 1.91 
Cash flows 484 –0.13 0.76 –13.44 1.77 
Sales growth 835 –0.34 1.23 –3.66 5.02 
Labor product. growth 767 0.09 1.3 –3.88 7.49 
Employment growth 769 –0.45 0.66 –4.76 1.68 
Tax arrears 431 –2.05 1.75 –11.04 6.63 
Trade arrears 437 –1.85 1.3 –6.45 5.35 
Wage arrears 427 –4.05 1.76 –11.09 4.62 
Note: Mann–Whitney two-sample statistic confirms that pairwise difference in distributions between non bankrupt, externally man-
aged, and liquidated firms for most of the ratios is significant at 5%, except for the insignificant difference between non bankrupt 
firms and liquidated in labor productivity growth; non bankrupt and externally managed in sales growth; externally managed and 
liquidated in cash flows, labor productivity growth, and tax arrears. 
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Table 3. Summary statistics of pre-EM and pre-LQ firms  
Variable Observations Mean Std. dev Min Max 
PRE-EM 
PC 820 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Leverage 509 –0.8 0.85 –11.41 1.23 
Current liquidity 508 –0.21 0.69 –2.82 3.54 
Cash flows 519 0.01 0.24 –1.2 1.37 
Labor prod. growth 445 –0.05 0.65 –4.33 2.78 
Employment growth 445 –0.07 0.31 –1.94 1.68 
Tax arrears 509 –2.34 1.42 –11.41 4.43 
Wage arrears 504 –4.42 1.44 –10.71 3.55 
Trade arrears 504 –2.1 1.05 –5.39 5.86 
PRE-LQ 
PC 6267 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Leverage 1908 –0.67 0.88 –6.82 7.52 
Current liquidity 1905 –0.35 0.82 –5.2 6.47 
Cash flows 1990 –0.05 0.6 –7.42 8.12 
Labor prod. growth 3289 –0.06 0.85 –4.18 5.73 
Employment growth 3289 –0.15 0.42 –3.95 2 
Tax arrears 1904 –2.15 1.61 –11.27 7.4 
Wage arrears 1856 –4.38 1.54 –11.43 4.57 
Trade arrears 1881 –2.03 1.38 –8.4 6.97 
Note: Pre-bankruptcy characteristics of firms where formal procedure was initiated in the form of EM (pre-EM) or LQ (pre-LQ) are 
presented, i.e. firms where LQ was initiated after EM are in the group of pre-EM firms. Mann–Whitney two-sample statistic rejects 
sameness of distributions of pre-EM and pre-LQ firms' characteristics at 1% for PC, Leverage, Current Liquidity, Employment 
growth, and Tax arrears. 
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Table 4A. Comparison of characteristics of PC firms: low and high category for political "monopoly"  
Variable Observations Mean Std. dev Min Max 
Low political "monopoly" 
Leverage 1013 –0.83 0.76 –3.65 1.71 
Current liquidity 1013 0.12 0.78 –3.67 2.9 
Cash flows 1026 0.08 0.88 –9.92 2.58 
Labor prod. growth 1174 0.09 0.88 –3.81 7.47 
Employment growth 1181 –0.09 0.48 –4.82 1.9 
Tax arrears 1007 –3.33 1.66 –12.44 7.39 
Wage arrears 984 –5.04 1.68 –13.5 4 
Trade arrears 1011 –2.48 1.32 –11.2 6.07 
High political "monopoly" 
Leverage 929 –0.7 0.77 –6.19 2.81 
Current liquidity 929 0.07 0.8 –4.09 4.15 
Cash flows 941 0.09 0.83 –10.5 6.69 
Labor prod. growth 975 0.06 0.75 –3.68 3.99 
Employment growth 977 –0.07 0.43 –4.27 2.45 
Tax arrears 924 –3.34 1.74 –12.45 4.17 
Wage arrears 898 –4.88 1.77 –14.55 2.3 
Trade arrears 927 –2.08 1.21 –9.51 4.36 
Note: Mann–Whitney two-sample statistic rejects sameness of distributions of high and low political "monopoly" at 1% for Leverage, 
Cash flows, and Trade arrears. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
 
 
40
Table 4B. Probit estimates of demand for PC  
Years 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Leverage 0.06 0.10 0.23 0.02 0.03 0.05 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.12)* (0.10) (0.14) (0.15) 
Current liquidity 0.04 0.12 0.21 0.09 0.12 0.12 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)** (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) 
Cash flows 0.21 0.31 0.23 0.11 –0.11 –0.19 
 (0.15) (0.18)* (0.21) (0.27) (0.05)** (0.09)** 
Labor product. growth 0.04 0.07 –0.20 –0.06 0.02 0.03 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)** (0.09) (0.09) (0.17) 
Employment growth –0.13 –0.11 –0.31 –0.02 0.00 0.41 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.14)** (0.16) (0.15) (0.25) 
Tax arrears –0.26 –0.23 –0.22 –0.16 0.05 0.02 
 (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.03) (0.04) 
Wage arrears –0.03 –0.03 –0.02 –0.05 –0.10 –0.13 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)* (0.06)** 
Trade arrears 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.02 –0.03 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05)** (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
IV: Political "monopoly" –0.16 –0.24 –0.30 –0.30 –0.38 –0.51 
 (0.09)* (0.09)*** (0.10)*** (0.10)*** (0.12)*** (0.13)*** 
Constant –1.68 –1.31 –1.23 –1.33 –0.71 –0.85 
 (0.26)*** (0.24)*** (0.26)*** (0.29)*** (0.32)** (0.38)** 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-stat. for IV 3.18 7.23 9.12 8.75 9.48 14.72 
Observations 1116 1060 805 719 482 426 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * — significant at 10%; ** — significant at 5%; *** — significant at 1%. Categorized 
political "monopoly" is an instrument. 
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Table 4C. Cox's proportional hazards model for instrumented PCs  
Dependent variable is the hazards ratio 
Event BNKR EM LQ 
Instrumented PC 0.09 0.67 0.02 
 (0.01)*** (0.74) (0.01)*** 
Leverage 0.86 0.61 1.01 
 (0.54) (0.21) (0.97) 
Current liquidity 0.59  0.56 
 (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
Cash flows 0.62 0.75 0.57 
 (0.00)*** (0.05)* (0.00)*** 
Labor product. growth 0.98 0.86 1.02 
 (0.87) (0.37) (0.89) 
Employment growth 0.68 0.71 0.71 
 (0.07)* (0.08)* (0.23) 
Tax arrears 1.27 1.30 1.25 
 (0.04)** (0.17) (0.16) 
Wage arrears 0.94 1.13 0.86 
 (0.32) (0.29) (0.06)* 
Trade arrears 1.23 1.47 1.16 
 (0.06)* (0.07)* (0.26) 
Industry dummies No No No 
Observations 3216 3216 3216 
Note: Robust p values in parentheses * — significant at 10%; ** — significant at 5%; *** — significant at 1%. 
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Table 5. Dynamic panel with fixed effects for log sales  
All firms Non BNKR, EM All firms Non BNKR, EM  
ln(sales) ln(sales) ln(sales) ln(sales) 
PC –0.03 –0.15 –0.04 –0.15 
 (0.06) (0.06)** (0.06) (0.06)** 
EM 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.09 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
LQ –0.24 –0.29 –0.24 –0.29 
 (0.08)*** (0.11)*** (0.08)*** (0.11)*** 
PC EM 0.09 0.14   
 (0.14) (0.15)   
PC before EM   0.09 0.11 
   (0.14) (0.14) 
PC after EM   0.11 0.18 
   (0.25) (0.28) 
PC LQ –0.11 –0.77 –0.11 –0.77 
 (0.27) (0.32)** (0.27) (0.32)** 
LQ after EM –0.13  –0.13  
 (0.13)  (0.13)  
Two lags of ln(sales) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10341 6095 10341 6095 
Number of firms 2637 1320 2637 1320 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * — significant at 10%; ** — significant at 5%; *** — significant at 1%. The same 
specification is applied for: complete set of firms; non-bankrupt and externally managed ones. 
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Table 6. Dynamic panel with fixed effects for log labor productivity (lprod)  
 All firms Non BNKR, EM All firms Non BNKR, EM 
 ln(lprod) ln(lprod) ln(lprod) ln(lprod) 
PC –0.15 –0.14 –0.15 –0.14 
 (0.06)** (0.06)** (0.06)** (0.06)** 
EM 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
LQ 0.15 0.05 0.15 0.05 
 (0.09)* (0.14) (0.09)* (0.14) 
PC EM 0.21 0.20   
 (0.17) (0.17)   
PC before EM   0.24 0.23 
   (0.16) (0.16) 
PC after EM   0.16 0.16 
   (0.33) (0.34) 
PC LQ 0.28 –0.23 0.28 –0.23 
 (0.33) (0.42) (0.33) (0.42) 
LQ after EM –0.17  –0.17  
 (0.16)  (0.16)  
Two lags of ln(lprod) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10172 5957 10172 5957 
Number of firms 2627 1316 2627 1316 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * — significant at 10%; ** — significant at 5%; *** — significant at 1%. The same 
specification is applied for: complete set of firms; non-bankrupt and externally managed ones. 
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Table 7. Dynamic panel with fixed effects for log employment (emp)  
 All firms Non BNKR, EM All firms Non BNKR, EM 
 ln(emp) ln(emp) ln(emp) ln(emp) 
PC 0.02 –0.02 0.01 –0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
EM 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 
 (0.03) (0.03)** (0.03) (0.03)** 
LQ –0.37 –0.35 –0.37 –0.35 
 (0.04)*** (0.07)*** (0.04)*** (0.07)*** 
PC EM –0.03 –0.05   
 (0.06) (0.07)   
PC before EM   –0.03 –0.09 
   (0.10) (0.12) 
PC after EM   –0.02 0.01 
   (0.05) (0.05) 
PC LQ –0.35 –0.50 –0.35 –0.49 
 (0.21)* (0.28)* (0.21)* (0.28)* 
LQ after EM –0.00  –0.00  
 (0.08)  (0.08)  
Two lags of ln(emp) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10184 5968 10184 5968 
Number of firms 2630 1318 2630 1318 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * — significant at 10%; ** — significant at 5%; *** — significant at 1%. The same 
specification is applied for: complete set of firms; non-bankrupt and externally managed ones. 
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Table 8A. Summary statistics for external management  
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
EM 
Subjective measures 
Unique producer 82 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Company-town*** 82 0.29 0.46 0 1 
Ownership 
State stake 82 0.07 0.21 0 1 
Region stake 82 0.06 0.21 0 1 
Town stake 82 0.25 0.41 0 1 
Petitioner 
FSFO 82 0.5 0.5 0 1 
Creditor** 82 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Public prosecutor** 82 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Self-initiation 82 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Tax service 82 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Financial ratios 
Leverage 82 –0.99 0.81 –4.66 0.09 
Current liquidity** 81 –0.79 0.73 –3.21 –0.01 
Cash flow 82 –0.5 0.43 –2.06 –0.02 
Labor productivity 72 0.47 0.39 0.03 1.97 
Employment** 72 4.37 0.65 2.3 5.53 
Fixed assets 82 –3.83 1.35 –8.87 1.17 
Accounts receivable* 82 0.4 0.49 0 3.37 
Wage arrears*** 82 0.09 0.2 0 1.06 
Tax arrears*** 82 1.69 1.97 0 6.4 
Trade arrears*** 82 0.94 0.83 0 3.22 
Credit arrears*** 82 2.02 2.29 0 7.6 
Sales*** 82 3.43 1.07 0.17 5.43 
Number of creditors*** 81 4.06 4.58 1 29 
Debt in supervision*** 82 947 749.82 120 4100 
Note: Wilcoxon test: means of EM and LQ are significantly different * — at 10%; ** — at 5%; *** — at 1%. 
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Table 8B. Summary statistics for liquidation  
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
LQ 
Subjective measures 
Unique producer 288 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Company-town*** 288 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Ownership 
State stake 288 0.06 0.19 0 1 
Region stake 288 0.07 0.21 0 1 
Town stake 288 0.12 0.3 0 1 
Petitioner 
FSFO 288 0.48 0.5 0 1 
Creditor** 288 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Public prosecutor** 288 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Self-initiation 288 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Tax service 288 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Financial ratios 
Leverage 277 –0.87 0.7 –4.82 –0.07 
Current liquidity** 274 –0.61 0.6 –3.89 –0.01 
Cash flow 278 –0.57 0.62 –4.06 –0.01 
Labor productivity 277 0.54 0.5 0 3.16 
Employment** 277 4.52 0.67 1.61 5.99 
Fixed assets 277 –3.81 1.41 –8.89 –0.04 
Accounts receivable* 278 0.3 0.39 0.01 3.1 
Wage arrears*** 278 0.2 0.33 0 2.28 
Tax arrears*** 278 3.7 0.85 0.08 4.62 
Trade arrears*** 278 0.62 0.69 0 4.24 
Credit arrears*** 278 3.61 0.89 0.14 4.59 
Sales*** 278 3.73 1.06 –0.67 5.47 
Number of creditors*** 288 24.22 14.47 0 50 
Debt in supervision*** 288 2262.62 1589.93 0 7100 
Note: Wilcoxon test: means of EM and LQ are significantly different * — at 10%; ** — at 5%; *** — at 1%. 
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Table 9. Logit estimation for EM initiation (marginal effects)  
 (1) dy/dx (2) dy/dx (3) dy/dx 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index 0.13 0.16 0.20 
 (0.05)*** (0.06)*** (0.08)*** 
Creditor-initiated –0.12 –0.11 –0.04 
 (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03) 
Self-initiated 0.10 0.11 0.07 
 (0.06) (0.06)* (0.06) 
Municipal share 0.08 0.09 0.03 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) 
Voting outcome 0.06 0.06 0.07 
 (0.03)** (0.03)** (0.03)** 
Leverage –0.01 –0.01 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) 
Current liquidity 0.02 0.02 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
Cash flow 0.04 0.04 0.07 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
Tax arrears –0.09 –0.08 –0.05 
 (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** 
Credit arrears –0.04 –0.05 –0.05 
 (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** 
Employment –0.04 –0.03 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Absence of FSFO –0.02 –0.02 –0.08 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.03)*** 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 313 313 159 
Pseudo R2 0.43 0.45 0.47 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,* — significant at 10%; ** — significant at 5%; *** — significant at 1%. Results of the 
following regressions are presented: (1) full sample; (2) sample with winsorized Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and financial ratios at 
5% and 95%; (3) sample where observations with Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and financial ratios beyond 5% and 95% percentile 
are excluded. 
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Table 10. Logit estimation for probability of low or high debt repayment in bankruptcy (marginal effects)  
 (1) dy/dx (2) dy/dx (3) dy/dx 
EM –0.21 –0.22 –0.21 
 (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.09)** 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index –0.02 –0.01 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
Leverage –0.02 –0.03 –0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
Current liquidity  0.03 0.01 –0.14 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) 
Cash flow 0.06 0.09 0.08 
 (0.04)* (0.05)* (0.08) 
Employment –0.03 –0.03 –0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Court's discretion –0.05 –0.06 –0.06 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Absence of FSFO 0.12 0.12 0.21 
 (0.06)* (0.07)* (0.06)*** 
Observations 343 343 206 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06 0.07 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,* — significant at 10%; ** — significant at 5%; *** — significant at 1%. Results of the 
following regressions are presented: (1) full sample; (2) sample with winsorized Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and financial ratios at 
5% and 95%; (3) sample where observations with Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and financial ratios beyond 5% and 95% percentile 
are excluded. 
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Table 11. Logit estimation for probability of debt repayment to unsecured creditor(marginal effects)  
 (1) dy/dx (2) dy/dx (3) dy/dx 
EM –0.09 –0.08 –0.13 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index 0.02 0.02 0.05 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
Debt 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage –0.05 –0.06 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03)* (0.04) 
Cash flow 0.05 0.08 0.13 
 (0.03)* (0.04)* (0.06)** 
Current liquidity 0.00 –0.01 –0.07 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) 
Employment –0.04 –0.04 –0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Desired procedure 0.06 0.06 0.09 
 (0.03)* (0.03)* (0.04)** 
Court's discretion in favor of creditor –0.05 –0.05 –0.12 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
Absence of FSFO –0.05 –0.05 –0.01 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1289 1289 744 
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.07 0.13 
Note: Standard errors adjusted for clustering on firms' id in parentheses,* — significant at 10%; ** — significant at 5%; *** — sig-
nificant at 1%. Results of the following regressions are presented: (1) full sample; (2) sample with winsorized Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index and financial ratios at 5% and 95%; (3) sample where observations with Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and financial ratios be-
yond 5% and 95% percentile are excluded. 
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